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Policy-making in Reform China – characterized by its gradualism – has been guided and 
spear-headed by pilot schemes carried out in specific regions, provinces and cities, which in 
turn inform directives and programs that are then passed as national policies. This downward 
trajectory of policy implementation is in turn affected by local socio-economic conditions, by 
the locality’s relative position of power in the administrative hierarchy, and by the degree of 
resistance from those whose interests are being endangered. Paradoxically, despite the 
important influence of local input on policy implementation, the Chinese government has 
continued to achieve almost universal compliance with the national goals it has set out 
(Solinger, 2004).  
 
Allowing for regional variations in policy implementation has been a long accepted practice 
in Chinese politics. Given China’s scale and diversity, the argument goes, accomplishing 
homogeneous implementation of policies is not only unrealistic, but is also not necessarily 
desirable. China’s decision-making process at the sub-national level is nonetheless not 
without its critics. Particularly at the county level, decision-making has often been described 
as being dominated by the personal interests of local officials (Liu, 2003), who are portrayed 
as engaging in clientelist (Pearson, 1997) or predatory practices (Bernstein & Lu, 2000). 
Bureaucratic indiscipline, as Lu calls it, has prompted some local cadres to engage in corrupt 
practices, taking advantage of existing legal and institutional loopholes resulting from the 
prevalence of a dual-track system (Lu, 2000). At the same time, the numerous cases of 
successful local government entrepreneurialism suggest that local cadres are not as 
undisciplined and incapable as often perceived.    
 
The prevalence of developmentalist practices alongside corruption becomes less of a paradox 
when analysed within the framework of the Party-state – where political and government 
power converge in a single ruling entity – and of a fiscal system in which local revenue can 
hardly meet expenditure needs. China has been unique among developing countries in the 
degree of administrative and fiscal decentralization achieved since the early 1980s, which has 
given sub-national governments greater room for manoeuvre and leverage vis-a-vis the 
central government. According to the fiscal interest model greater local administrative and 
fiscal capacity helps generate greater local political power and local government 
accountability (Weingast, 2006). Revenue independence has indeed given richer coastal 
provinces greater independence to favour their own policy priorities (Liu et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, some authors have highlighted the fact that greater bargaining power at the sub-
national level has not necessarily translated into the weakening of the Party-State (Huang, 
1996; Edin, 2003; Whiting, 2004). Compliance with the centre has mainly been achieved 
through the establishment of policy mandates and strict implementation of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) cadre evaluation system, both aimed at restraining local 
government’s predatory behaviour and cadre’s corrupt practices. Given China’s political 
centralization under the CCP, local government accountability cannot come through citizen 
monitoring, but has rather been pursued from above.   
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Having a set of designated targets upon which cadres are evaluated (and thus promoted or 
demoted) has reinforced state capacity at the centre, while contributing to the durability of 
CCP rule (Whiting, 2004). Since the mid-1990s, concerns over growing inequalities, and 
social and political stability fostered a greater sophistication of the cadre evaluation system, 
which continued to emphasise the importance of economic performance, but which now also 
emphasises social order (shehui zhi’an) together with family planning as the two overall 
priority targets specified in cadre’s performance contracts (Edin, 2003). In 2007 a new 
regulation to curb cadre misconduct goes as far as framing the moral values to be followed by 
government officials. It allows, for example, for the firing of government officials who abuse 
or abandon family members or refuse to support their elderly relations (Xinhua News Agency, 
29 April 2007; China Daily, 9 April 2007). Compliance with evaluation targets, however, has 
been a double-edged knife. While it allows the central government some control over local 
governance, its centrally mandated policies have caused inefficiencies in the use of scarce 
local resources and policy discontinuity as local cadres strive to comply with ever changing 
policy priorities. Consequently, decision-making and budget allocation at the local level often 
do not reflect local needs, specifically the needs of vulnerable social groups (Wang, 2002).  
 
From the 1990s on, the incongruence between policy and actual local needs has heightened 
social problems to such an extent that it has prompted influential government policy advisors 
Hu Angang and Wang Shaoguang to state that in their opinion ‘the problems that beset 
China’s current social conditions as a whole are extremely severe, and China is on the brink 
of once again entering a period of social instability’ (Wang, et al., 2003, 6). The national 
government has certainly felt pressure to give greater importance to social policy and welfare 
programs, as part of a traditional emphasis on economic development, in an effort to maintain 
social stability and more sustained economic growth.  
 
Can the Government Kill Two Birds with One Stone? Maintaining Regime Stability 
while Promoting Social Development 
 
The Chinese government was not naïve about the fact that the introduction of market forces 
would inevitably increase inequalities; yet, from the onset of the reform process, it claimed it 
would uphold its commitment to egalitarianism and social justice. This was encompassed in 
the slogan of ‘building a xiaokang or an all-round well-off society’,1
 
 which the government 
put forward as the marker of China’s market economy with Chinese characteristics.  As 
economic transition advanced, however, it became more evident that the gains of rapid 
economic growth were not being equally enjoyed in the different regions or among different 
social groups. A common belief among the Chinese leadership up until the late 1990s was 
that economic growth would subsequently bring about the formation of a xiaokang society. 
Nonetheless, growing social problems attested to the fact that the relationship between 
economic growth and social development was not a straightforward one.  
Social issues have subsequently been pushed to the fore on the PRC’s domestic agenda. The 
leadership headed by president Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao begun to talk about the 
importance of the ‘quality’ of economic growth as a prerequisite to the configuration of a 
‘harmonious society’ (People’s Daily Online, 8 Feb. 2005) – the term that subsequently 
substituted that of xiaokang. This change in the use of words is significant and reflects the 
concerns over prevailing social dislocation, and – again – recognizes that economic growth 
                                                 
1 Cui Zhiyuan ( 2004) has also called it a petty-bourgeois society.  
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per se cannot alleviate inequalities. China’s society needs to be better off, but also to achieve 
social harmony.  
 
As put forward at the Sixth  Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP, two of the main 
objectives of this harmonious socialist society are: to bridge the widening gap between urban 
and rural development – in order to achieve a reasonable income distribution pattern, and; to 
improve the basic public service system (People’s Daily Online, 12 Oct. 2006).  These are 
not new concepts for China’s socialist regime, but the mere fact that they are being re-
emphasised is evidence of current dire inequalities. More interesting, perhaps, is the new 
focus on safeguarding citizen’s lawful rights – in particular property rights – as one of the 
necessary foundations of a harmonious society. And although democratic values have also 
been thrown into the equation, the Party-State has made it clear that a harmonious society has 
to be built under the leadership of the CCP.  
 
While this position may seem to reinforce commentators critique of China’s lack of political 
reform and lack of government accountability, David Goodman has accurately pointed out 
that although there has certainly been no institutionalised open national-level political 
competition, there have been crucial changes in the behaviour of China’s authoritarian regime 
(Goodman, 2008). According to Goodman, the most significant change has been that the state 
itself has changed its own view of the relationship between state and society.  
 
One of the results is necessarily that state and society are in some senses now more clearly 
differentiated, at least to the extent that the government increasingly comes to recognize certain 
activities as not its responsibility and even possibly not even in its purview (Goodman, 2008). 
 
This shedding of responsibilities has been described by David Harvey as neoliberalism ‘with 
Chinese Characteristics’,2
  
 where the state seeks to encourage a democracy of consumption 
(my emphasis), while retreating from many of its welfare and social responsibilities (Harvey, 
2005, 125). This is directly reflected in increased devolution of expenditure responsibilities to 
sub-national governments and in the growing commodification of public services. Thus, as 
Goodman rightly points out, even within a context of limited political competition, these 
changes in the relationship between state and society do matter in the reconfiguration of local 
governance and local economic performance (Goodman, 2008).     
The reform of the social security and welfare systems are a reflection of the retreat from a 
paternalistic socialist state that provided the iron rice bowl to its proletariat, to a more 
pragmatic state that serves mainly as a regulator of services. Originally, the reform of the 
social safety net was envisioned as a support mechanism for the overhauling of the state-
owned sector and of the welfare of its workers, thus it was a very narrowly defined social 
security system, as it only took into consideration the interests of state employees. Over 
almost thirty years of reform the composition of China’s economy has changed dramatically, 
with the state sector no longer the main player in either production or employment. 
Modifications to existing rules and regulations governing the social security and welfare 
system have gradually expanded – at least on paper – the net of social and welfare benefits to 
those in the private sector and to the self-employed. Yet, despite these positive policy 
changes, coverage continues to discriminate between those with an urban and those with a 
rural household registration. 
                                                 
2 See also Wang, 2003.  
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While structural problems continue to be an important barrier to the development of a more 
inclusive welfare regime, the biggest barrier to the implementation of the social security 
system has been limited financial resources available to local governments. Administrative 
and fiscal decentralisation, while awarding local governments larger claims over local 
revenue, has also imposed too many responsibilities – particularly on county and township 
governments. At the county level, continued prioritisation of economic goals and budgeting 
practices has often worked against more generous allocations for social security and public 
services. Meantime the new social security system has failed to create sufficient incentives 
for local governments, enterprises or even employees to join and support social insurance 
schemes.  
 
With policy priorities at the centre focusing more on the qualitative side of development, 
however, county cadres cannot afford to disregard the new directives from Beijing. Behind 
this preoccupation is the realization that social stability is a precondition for a smooth 
economic transition and for the continuation of political supremacy by the CCP. One could 
even argue that this commitment to a more inclusive socio-economic development is not only 
rhetorical, but a legitimate one. Whether or not the PRC can build a harmonious society will 
be determined to a significant extent by the quality and sophistication of governance at the 
county level. The latter, in turn, will necessitate more than the passing of new policy 
documents and regulations, but will require a greater commitment to redistribution, and 
increased financial transfers that are not delivered in a one-size-fits-all manner.  
 
Empirical data from a study carried out between 2003 and 2005 in Hongtong County, Shanxi 
Province will be used here to examine the implementation of new social policies through the 
analysis of the issues around the implementation of the urban social security system, and the 
analysis of changing governance strategies for the provision of public services. Though 
shortcomings are still observed in the provision of social safety nets, there is also 
considerable awareness among the county leadership of the problems brought by rural-urban 
migration, urbanization, and state owned enterprise reform, among others. There is 
willingness to act and a capacity to promote social development and social inclusion, though 
this has often been pursued not so much through increased government spending, but through 
an active encouragement of private participation.  
 
Though this may raise concerns over equity and access to services, private providers – 
particularly in the health sector – seem to be catering for those not covered by social health 
insurance. Similarly, in the housing sector private involvement has had a positive influence, 
making urban housing more affordable to rural workers. In the education sector, however, 
private competition has often worked against the quality of education, and has made formal 
education and extra-curricular activities more costly. A further concern is the nature of the 
relationship between local government cadres and private entrepreneurs; the creation of 
networks of private interest, and the consequences for the social hierarchies being configured 
in the town. Notwithstanding these issues, as this case study evidences, small towns seem to 
be offering rural migrants the opportunities for social and economic inclusion denied to them 
in larger cities.  
 
Shanxi Province: Economic Restructuring and the Consequences for Social Security 
 
In the reform era public services provision and the development of local safety nets have 
been inextricably linked to pre-reform local economic structures. In provinces and cities 
where the state owned sector had dominated the local economy the Central Government 
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promoted early and more inclusive campaigns to tackle the various issues resulting from the 
overhauling of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Zheng, 2006; Kernen, 2003), such as lay-offs, 
unemployment, and early retirements. Yet, even though the reinforcement of social safety 
nets has enjoyed subsidization by the Central Government, ultimately the development of 
local welfare schemes continue to depend to a large extent on the economic circumstances of 
the locality.  
 
Located in North China, Shanxi is a middle range province, which was relatively slow in 
introducing and implementing economic and institutional changes. Its close economic and 
political ties with the Central government as well as its limited connections with the rest of 
the country and the outside world were largely responsible for that delayed transformation. 
Up until the late 1980s dependence on investment from the Centre had strongly influenced 
Shanxi’s development strategies, which concentrated on the exploitation of coal and the 
establishment of a heavy industry base. With increased economic liberalization, however, the 
Central government shifted its economic priorities to the east coast (Goodman, 1989; Cannon 
and Jenkins, 1990; Zhao and Tong, 2000), significantly reducing its investment commitment 
in Shanxi.   
 
From the early 1990s on, Shanxi Province had to increasingly depend on local sources of 
investment and economic growth to bring its economy out of recession. In half a decade the 
province had managed to recover from the economic slump, with GDP growth rates 
surpassing the national average, although per capita income remained behind the 
corresponding national figure (Table 1). Moreover, by the end of the decade average 
provincial urban salary levels were the lowest in the country (Zhang, 2000). Wage disparities 
between traditional (i.e. mining) and service industries (particularly finance and insurance 
companies) had also widened. At the same time, the gap between urban and rural income and 
expenditure had expanded at a more rapid pace than elsewhere in the country.  
 
Table 1 Shanxi in China - National income and expenditure  
Year Urban 
Income 
  Urban 
Expenditure 
  Rural 
Income 
  Rural 
Expenditure 
  
 Shanxi China C/S Shanxi China C/S Shanxi China C/S Shanxi China C/S 
1985 595 739 1.24 595 673 1.31 358 398 1.11 273 317 1.16 
1990 1,291 1,510 1.16 1,048 1,279 1.22 604 686 1.13 488 584 1.19 
1995 3,306 4,283 1.29 2,641 3,538 1.33 1,208 1,578 1.30 928 1,310 1.41 
2000 4,724 6,280 1.32 3,942 4,998 1.26 1,906 2,253 1.18 1,149 1,670 1.45 
2002 6,234 7,703 1.23 4,711 5,617 1.19 2,150 2,476 1.15 1,355 1,810 1.33 
    
Urban income figures refer to annual disposable income; rural income refers to annual net income.  
Sources: Shanxi Statistical Yearbook, 2003, 189, 203-204, and China Statistical Yearbook, 2003 
[Online]. 
 
Paradoxically, other than income, Shanxi Province and especially its rural areas ranked 
relatively well in most social indicators compared to other provincial units. Shanxi’s literacy 
level, in particular, has been one of the highest in the country (China Human Development 
Report, 2005). In 2003, Shanxi’s education index was 6th among 31 provinces, municipalities 
and autonomous regions (154). That same year high school attendance rate was an impressive 
rank 7, with a 71.4 per cent attendance rate. Furthermore, Shanxi Province seemed to have 
been successful in addressing some of the problems of SOE restructuring, managing to keep 
Provincial China , Vol. 2, No. 1, September 2010                73                                                                                                        
 
 
 
the rate of registered unemployment (2003) at 3.1 per cent,3
 
 a slightly lower figure than the 
3.3 per cent rate in 1990 (165).  
            In regards to employee participation in the various social insurance schemes part of the Urban 
Labour Social Security System (ULSSS) Shanxi Province enjoyed similar enrolment levels to 
those of other middle range and some better off provinces. Nevertheless, it must be noted that 
overall insurance coverage levels throughout the PRC remained very low. By 2003, around 
28 per cent of Shanxi’s urban population was enrolled in both pension and unemployment 
insurance schemes, while 19 per cent were covered with health insurance.4
 
 
It has already been noted that the development and implementation of the new national social 
security system and of the various social assistance schemes has gone hand in hand with the 
restructuring of the state-owned sector. Changes in enterprise ownership have had direct 
consequences on coverage and funding of social insurance schemes. Until recently, 
throughout the PRC, it has been mostly SOEs, public service enterprises (PSU), and 
government departments who have enrolled their employees in the ULSSS. Enterprise 
participation outside of the public sector has been difficult to expand, while at the same time 
the number of SOEs unable or unwilling to comply with insurance contributions has 
increased.  
 
In Shanxi Province the overhauling of the SOE sector inevitably reconfigured the structure of 
the economy, promoting the development of county rural industries, which came to form a 
sizeable private sector (Goodman, 1999). By the end of the 1990s the private sector of the 
economy accounted for 33 per cent of the provincial GDP, only second to that of Zhejiang 
Province.5
 
 By 2002 the TVE sector’s share of employment was 60.2 per cent, accounting for 
62.3 per cent of the total provincial industrial income (Shanxi Provincial People’s 
Government, 23 March 2005). Moreover, in Shanxi’s urban areas private enterprises went 
from employing just over a thousand people in 1980, to employ almost 4 per cent of the total 
labour force in 2002. As elsewhere in the country changes in enterprise ownership had direct 
consequences on coverage and funding of social insurance schemes.  
Hongtong County’s case study helps illustrate some of those changes brought mainly by the 
restructuring of the local economy. The data used in this study was collected between 2001 
and 2003 in Dahuaishu Town, Hongtong’s county seat. Interviews were carried out with a 
total of 79 individuals, of whom 57 were rural migrant workers; 10 local permanent urban 
residents; 6 county-level government officials, and; 6 staff of government departments and 
public service enterprises (PSE). The analysis carried out here is mainly of a qualitative 
nature, though statistical figures have also been used to assist the interpretation of the 
qualitative data (Brannen, 2005, 176-177). Separate questionnaires were developed for each 
of the four surveyed groups. Rural and urban interviewees were selected and recruited 
through local official and informal connections. Interviews with government officials and 
                                                 
3 The highest unemployment rate that year was that of Guangdong (6.5 per cent), and the lowest was that of 
Shanghai (1.4 per cent) (China Human Development Report, 2005, 165).  
4 That same year 12.72 per cent, 11.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent of China’s total urban population were 
participating in the pension, unemployment and health insurances respectively (China Statistical Yearbook, 
2004).   
5 For official purposes the National Bureau of Statistics defines enterprise ownership as private when one or up 
to 8 people own an enterprise. Within the private sector, statistics usually distinguish between individually 
owned enterprises (geti) and those owned by more than one person (siying). Private enterprises are also 
sometimes referred to as people-run enterprises (minying). 
Provincial China , Vol. 2, No. 1, September 2010                74                                                                                                        
 
 
 
other government staff were arranged with the help of various local cadres, to whom the 
author had been previously introduced through a personal connection.   
The relatively small interviewee sample used for this study highlights the issue of 
generalization and external validity of the research results. However, the research findings of 
this study are in no way intended to represent the realities of town development across China, 
but rather aim to contribute to the construction of a map of this highly diverse phenomenon. 
As previously stated, the statistical data used here has the purpose of contextualizing the 
empirical data, and when adequate will also be used to corroborate qualitative findings.  
 
Testing Local Social Safety Net Expansion: the Case of Hongtong County 
 
Despite the relatively late response to the reform effort, Shanxi’s regional economies were 
quick to catch up with reform changes. Though certainly economic development within the 
province continued to be characterized by widespread inequalities, some regions were 
successful in exploiting to their advantage the growing national demand for coal-derived 
energy and by-products. In order to do that, city and county governments had to make the 
coal-related industrial sector more efficient and more responsive to the demands of the 
market. Hongtong County is part of one of the most economically dynamic prefectures in the 
province – Linfen City – located in the southern part of Shanxi. With a GDP of over 4.5 
billion yuan in 2003 Hongtong’s economy ranked 8th among all counties, cities and districts 
in the province. Yet, in contrast to its more urbanized counterparts, the countryside remained 
an important component of Hongtong’s economy, together with its township and village 
enterprises (TVEs). In 2002 there were 22,714 township enterprises registered in the county, 
employing 89,454 people or 31.02 per cent of the total rural labour force (288,319). Though 
small in size (average of 3.9 workers per enterprise) together TVEs created a sizable output 
value close to 6 billion yuan (Hongtong County Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2002).  
 
Coal related industries, especially two large state owned enterprises, were also important 
employers in two of the county’s small towns – Zhaocheng and Guangshengsi – as well as 
being large contributors to the county’s coffers. Non-state coalmines played an even more 
important role in this sector, becoming the main source of private wealth in the county. Apart 
from the big SOEs, a large part of the state-owned sector had been restructured. In half a 
decade, from the mid to the end of the 1990s, around 95 per cent of the SOEs in Hongtong 
County had changed or were in the process of changing their ownership structure. 6
 
 The 
majority of those SOEs became share-holding enterprises (gufen), while smaller enterprises 
or those experiencing bankruptcy were mostly privatized.  
Access to Social Insurances 
 
By 1998, a significant number of SOEs had started to default on their social security and 
welfare responsibilities, and had started to shift the burden of social insurance benefits 
provision – especially pension payments – to the county’s Finance Department. The old 
social security and welfare system – based on funding and provision by the work unit – had 
remained largely unchanged. That same year, when the County Labour Department took 
responsibility for managing the new social security system for urban workers, the main 
problem faced by the Department was settling disputes between various work units and the 
                                                 
6 Interview with the Vice-Director of the County Labour and Social Security Department. Dahuaishu Town, 
Hongtong County. (31 Oct. 2004).  
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county government over financial responsibility of workers’ insurance payments.7
 
 Between 
1997 and 1998 alone the number of employees in state owned enterprises had decreased by 
over 30 per cent, while the overall number of those fully employed also decreased in absolute 
terms – from 36,835 workers in 1997 to 32,701 in 1998 (Hongtong County Statistical 
Yearbook, 2000-2002). This sudden increase in the number of workers needing 
unemployment insurance benefits or pension insurance payments presented a large financial 
burden to both enterprises and local government.   
The introduction of a new social security system thus necessitated strong financial backing 
from the county government, which became directly responsible for subsidizing pension 
payments to SOEs’ retirees, and for covering the pension expenses of civil servants and other 
government employees. Social funds for the new insurance system had to practically be built 
from scratch, due to the continued financial deterioration of SOEs, many of which had 
stopped contributing to workers’ insurances. Meanwhile, contributions from the non-state 
sector remained minimal. Recruiting new enterprises into the new social security system, 
however, had to remain on the backburner of an already overwhelmed Labour and Social 
Security Department (LSSD).  
 
One of the first tasks taken over by the newly created LSSD was related to dispute settlement 
over wage arrears and laid-off workers’ unemployment compensations, as well as carrying 
out re-employment campaigns for laid-off workers in the state sector (Hongtong County 
Labour Department, 1998). This showed a rapid response to Central Government directives 
urging sub-national governments to deal with the increasing number of dismissals resulting 
from the overhauling of the SOE sector. Given the precarious financial situation of some 
SOEs, many workers had lost all insurance and welfare benefits when laid-off. The county 
government had to find ways to channel them back into the labour market where they could 
earn their livelihood, while keeping unemployment at manageable levels. In order to do that 
the Department offered various training courses, organized with the assistance of local 
enterprises, which advised the LSSD on the types of skills needed from potential employees. 
Training courses were often jointly financed by the LSSD and participating enterprises, and 
by small fees charged on participants. Moreover, the Department had also been made 
responsible for mobilizing resources to cover for unemployment insurance and other welfare 
payments for laid-off workers. 
 
Given the incipient nature of the social security system, the county government – aided by 
contributions from the Central and provincial governments – had to continue subsidizing 
social safety nets. Budget allocations for that purpose, however, tended to favour provision 
for bureaucrats. In the year 2000 pension payments for government employees accounted for 
15.78 per cent of the county’s total budget expenditure, while social insurance financial 
support for pension, unemployment and health insurance schemes accounted for only 0.8 per 
cent of the county’s total expenditure (Table 2). Nonetheless, from 2000 on expenditure 
shares for social insurance experienced a significant increase (though from a very low 
starting level), while contribution shares for public servants’ pensions stabilized. A small 
increase was also observed in health expenditure.  
               Table 2 Hongtong County – Selected budget expenses      Unit: 10,000 yuan 
 
                                                 
7 Interview with a staff member from the Social Insurance section of the County Labour and Social Security 
Department. Dahuaishu Town, Hongtong County (20 Oct. 2003). 
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 2000 % of total 2001 % of total 2002 % of total 
Total Expenditure 14757 100 20258 100 22936 100 
Education  3978 26.95 5420 26.75 6091 26.55 
Health  710 4.81 1123 5.54 1306 5.69 
Pensions for Retired 
Public Servants  2330 15.78 2874 14.18 3429 14.95 
Social Insurance 
Subsidy  119 0.8 220 1.08 569 2.48 
Government 
Administration 2352 15.93 3211 15.85 3441 15 
                     
 Source: Hongtong County Statistical Yearbook, 2000-2002, 316. 
 
The existing gap between funding for social security and funding for civil servants’ welfare 
reflected the continued preoccupation of the Party-State with the fate of its own staff. 
Funding prioritisation of state employees’ welfare came as no surprise, given that those 
workers represent the Party’s support base at the grassroots level. Civil servants and those 
working for public service units (PSU) had certainly fared much better than those working in 
SOEs. Maintaining support for the Party, however, is only part of the equation; this group is 
also the one that has traditionally held the strongest sense of entitlement. In a system where 
government and Party intersect in almost every field it has been crucial – on the one hand – to 
secure the loyalty of government employees, while – on the other hand – building legitimacy 
for the Party. So far the Party-State has been willing to pay the financial toll of keeping its 
bureaucrats secure. 
 
Social policies in reform China have also been characterized by their gradual and reactive 
nature. Both the Central government and sub-national governments have tended to protect the 
interests of those most dissatisfied and who are often more vocal in their demands; though 
they might not always be the most affected or more vulnerable social groups. Therefore, as 
the changing welfare regime threatened the benefits bureaucrats and other government 
employees had traditionally enjoyed, their entitlement rights had to be promptly addressed. In 
contrast, most employees in the non-state sector, especially rural migrant workers, who have 
traditionally enjoyed limited or no state benefits, had until then not voiced a demand for 
welfare rights. Particularly within counties, where towns are often newly created urban 
spaces, the number of those entitled to social benefits has tended to be limited, due to the 
existence of a small state sector and limited government administrative staff. Furthermore, a 
large part of the labour force in those towns holds a rural registration (though often working 
in the non-farm sector) and have therefore had limited access to urban social security.     
 
During interviews carried out with rural migrant workers in Dahuaishu Town respondents 
seemed to be mostly unaware of the new social security system, and even those enrolled in 
the system (who had been able to change their household registration into an urban one) had 
no clear knowledge of their entitlement rights. Most were unsure about which insurances 
were provided by their workplace, and did not know much about premiums contributed to the 
various insurance funds. Similarly, urban workers had only partial knowledge of the new 
system, as insurance provision varied from one workplace to another. In general, most 
respondents enrolled in the social security system were covered by at least one of three 
compulsory social insurances – old age insurance, health care insurance, and unemployment 
insurance – and only civil servants, teachers and doctors in the public sector were covered by 
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all social insurances as well as the housing provident fund.8
 
 Not all employees in government 
departments and public service industries, however, were included in the social security 
system. Government departments and PSU had to follow strict annual hiring quotas; a small 
percentage of those hired outside the quota were included in one or more of the social 
insurance schemes, but those hired on a temporary basis – usually to carry out menial jobs – 
were not included at all.  
Among SOE workers, in particular, insurance coverage had also to do with uncertainties 
about the financial well-being of the work place, and its capacity to afford insurance 
premiums. Respondents working for ailing SOEs, were often concerned about being able to 
access their social insurance benefits, since many of those laid-off had already lost all welfare 
benefits. From the interviewee sample of local urban residents all ten respondents were or 
had been state employees (employed by SOEs, government departments and PSU) yet, only 
four – one doctor, a teacher, and a staff member of the Public Security Department – were at 
the time of the interview covered by all social insurances. Two respondents had lost all social 
security benefits when laid-off. Wage arrears were also common, even within state 
enterprises. Some respondents had not received their wages for up to two years. Yet, despite 
this situation, the majority chose to maintain their work-relationship with the enterprise – 
while engaging in other economic activities to make a living – in order to keep their 
entitlement to welfare benefits.  
 
These workers often believed the county government would provide these enterprises with 
financial support to keep them afloat. One respondent working for the state owned Urban 
Water Company9
 
 (silaishui gongsi), an enterprise long experiencing financial difficulties, had 
chosen to retain her work relationship with the company, although she had not been paid for 
over a year. The reason behind her decision was the belief that the county government would 
not allow this enterprise to go bankrupt, and hence she chose remain with the company in 
order to maintain her entitlement to a pension.  
Among rural respondents, of those who had changed their household registration into an 
urban one (25 out of 57 respondents) only 12 were covered by at least one insurance scheme. 
Teachers were the only ones covered by all social insurances. Most had started off as rural 
teachers originally categorised as community teachers (minban laoshi) – holding an urban 
household registration but paid by the village government – and had later on been shifted into 
the public category (gongban laoshi)10
                                                 
8 The new social security system is comprised of old-age pension insurance (yanglao baoxian); medical 
insurance (yiliao baoxian); unemployment insurance (shiye baoxian); work injury insurance (gongshang 
baoxian); and childbirth insurance (shengyu baoxian). The first three insurance schemes are funded by 
contributions from firms, employees and government. The last two insurance schemes are funded solely by 
employers. The housing provident fund is sourced by employee and employer contributions (Yeung & Howes, 
2006).  
 gaining access to all social insurances. A young music 
teacher – pregnant at the time of the interview – for example, was to receive half a year’s 
extra salary from her school as part of her childbirth insurance. 
9 This company is responsible for supplying water for household and small business consumption. A separate 
enterprise is in charge of supplying water for industrial use. Even in a water scarce province like Shanxi, water 
prices remain below supply costs.    
10 All teachers in the public educational sector are classified as government cadres (ganbu), and are therefore 
eligible for urban registration. The minban category, however, allowed teachers to hold an urban hukou without 
losing their agricultural land. From July 2001 remaining minban or community teachers started to be converted 
into gongban teachers, which also meant they had to give up their agricultural land. This process was related to 
a State Council mandate that shifted responsibility over rural teachers’ salaries from the village to the county 
government. (World Bank, 2005, 40).  
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Length of membership in the system influenced the benefits received by these respondents, 
particularly in the case of pension premiums. Three older teachers, who were close to 
retirement, were to receive pension payments according to their length of service as public 
teachers and not for the overall length of time they had worked in their village school. One 
respondent had become a public teacher in 1989, while the other two respondents had only 
joined the gongban system in the late 1990s. When in 1997 one of these teachers was 
appointed as headmaster of Fengzhang Village primary school he was turned into a public 
teacher, and – in his own words – was then ‘forced’ (qiangpo) to join the social security 
system. By the time he retired (in 2007) he would have been part of the system for only ten 
years, and thus was unsure his pension would be sufficient to cover for all his and his family 
expenses. Hence he viewed insurance contributions as eating away at his personal income 
and savings, rather than as giving him security for the future.11
 
 
Another five respondents holding an urban household registration had previously been 
employed by a SOE and had at that point had access to social security benefits. Nonetheless, 
they had lost their job and welfare benefits as a result of their enterprises running into 
financial difficulties. One respondent working for an ailing state owned papermaking factory 
had been able to keep her job, as well as her old age and medical insurances thanks to the 
successful privatisation of her work unit. Two respondents working as nurses in a local public 
hospital were covered by old age,12 medical and unemployment insurance. The remaining 
two respondents (of the 12 with an urban household registration), who had been able to 
acquire an urban registration while working for a county government department 13
 
 were 
covered with medical insurance. They also mentioned receiving in-kind gifts (food, flour, 
new uniforms, and so on) from the Department during national holidays.  
The case of these two last respondents is significant because, again, they help illustrate the 
prevalent importance of personal connections (guanxi) in gaining access to services. 
Department leaders – especially those with experience at the grass roots levels – typically 
take under their wing individuals who had previously worked for them at the township and 
village levels. Individual’s support networks have been shown to encompass ties that go well 
beyond kinship links. Friendship ties, in particular, play a strong supportive role in practical – 
non-personal – matters, such as career development and financial support (Zhang and Ruan, 
2001). The relationship cannot be described solely in terms of favouritism or nepotism, but as 
one in which a complex mix of human capital and development potential, as well as an 
individuals’ social capital intermingle. Nevertheless, as has been argued by Zhang and Li, 
those without access to such connections can be disadvantaged when searching for non-farm 
employment, a situation that has direct repercussions on the household’s income (Zhang and 
Li, 2003). The personal relationships of those two respondents not only secured them an 
urban job, but were also a means through which they were able to change their household 
registration and gain access to social security and welfare benefits.  
 
Private participation in the insurances market is incipient and still very limited. And although 
private insurances remain an expensive alternative for the majority of the population, private 
                                                 
11 His wife was also a gongban teacher eligible for a pension. Both pensions would allow them to secure a 
relatively comfortable lifestyle in the village. Yet, their concern was about affording the education expenses of 
their 17 year old daughter, whom they needed to support through university.   
12 They were able to change their registration into an urban one when they enrolled in the nursing college. 
13 One worked as a driver for the director of the Department, and the other was the hairdresser of the 
Department.  
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insurance companies have launched aggressive campaigns even at the county level. While 
carrying out fieldwork in Hongtong County it was interesting to observe that private 
insurance was only mentioned by rural migrant workers. Private insurance plans offered an 
alternative to wealthy rural entrepreneurs, who due to their rural registration could not 
become members of the urban labour social security system. Out of 57 rural respondents, 
however, only three had private insurance coverage.14
 
 
The cases of both urban and rural workers with access to social security and welfare confirm 
the ideas prevalent in the literature, which state that it is mainly the state part of the economy 
that has provided employees with insurance coverage. Yet, even within the state sector, 
insurance coverage (and honouring of insurance payments) depends greatly on the financial 
capabilities of the work unit – particularly in the case of SOEs. Interviews also attested to the 
fact that in other sectors of the economy – including collective, share holding, as well as 
private enterprises – employees are not offered insurance coverage. In Hongtong County, 
compulsory enrolment in the social security system has only applied to SOEs, PSUs, and the 
administrative branches of the government. By 2005 the County Labour and Social Security 
Department had not yet been granted any legal powers to make enterprises from the non-
public sector of the economy join the system.   
 
Access to Education 
 
In terms of financing, the bulk of government budgeting for education is channelled into 
public primary and junior secondary schools. Although in theory tuition-free, local 
governments allow these schools to charge additional fees up to a pre-established maximum 
ceiling. In 2003, government established fee levels for primary education were 40 to 50 yuan 
per student per year; and 60 to 70 yuan for junior secondary education.15
 
 These, however, 
were only benchmarks, and parents often ended up paying several hundred yuan each year on 
school related fees. Responsibility over primary and junior secondary schools fell under the 
township governments. The two senior secondary schools located in Dahuaishu Town came 
under the jurisdiction of Linfen City since they are district level schools. The other four 
senior secondary schools are run by the county government and are located in the main towns.  
This division of responsibilities over the management of schools influences the budget each 
school gets. First, the education budget is set by the County Finance Department based on the 
sector’s budget from the previous year and on the size of the overall official county budget. 
Once decided, shares are distributed to the towns and townships, who in turn apportion it to 
the various schools under their direct responsibility. A large share of those funds tends to stay 
in the bigger towns, especially in the county capital. The overall quality of a school typically 
reflects this hierarchical division of the monies. District level schools are often better off than 
other county schools, as they receive their budget directly from the Linfen City 
government.16
 
  
In spite of the fact that education accounts for over 26 per cent of total budget expenditures of 
the county government, government appropriations alone are not sufficient to sustain 
compulsory education. Schools are increasingly reliant on fees, extra curricular activities, and 
                                                 
14 Two had acquired medical insurance and one an education insurance to cover for schooling expenses of their 
child.  
15 Interview with the Director of the County Education Department. (16 Oct. 2003).  
16 Senior secondary schools are also able to charge relatively high tuition fees, which represent a substantial part 
of the schools’ budget. 
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on private and community donations to improve the curriculum, to give benefits to teachers 
(to compensate for low salaries), and to improve the physical conditions of schools. 
According to official figures, between 1981 and 1991 in Shanxi province 68.26 per cent of 
funding for the improvement of operation conditions in public schools came from ‘multiple 
channels’ other than government appropriations (Lo, 1999). In Hongtong County private and 
community contributions have been crucial to restore the buildings of hundreds of village 
schools deemed too dangerous to continue operating. In 2005 private individuals donated 
over 40 million yuan to repair county schools (Huaixiang Education Park, 10 Sept. 2005). 
Teachers, as well, use extra classes as a way to supplement their salaries.17
 
  
Students coming from village and township schools are often at a disadvantage to those from 
urban schools, which are better equipped and have better trained teachers. Moreover, rural 
students often come from relatively low income families; another obstacle to their 
educational attainment. In general, throughout China nearly all urban children complete the 
nine years of compulsory education. It is in the rural areas where drop-outs more frequently 
occur.18 Of the 54 rural respondents from the survey sample who gave information about 
their level of education (three respondents did not provide information about their schooling) 
two were illiterate; one had received no formal education, while the other had only completed 
3 years of primary schooling.19
 
  
According to the then director of the County Education Department20
 
 all school-age children 
in the county were attending school at primary and secondary level. The county, he claimed 
was therefore fully compliant with the Law of Compulsory Education. Statistical data was of 
little help when trying to corroborate whether that was in fact the case. County statistics 
(available from 2000) only give figures of the total number of students enrolled in public 
schools in a specific year. Without the exact numbers of new school enrolments and of 
graduates it is impossible to calculate the percentage of students from primary school who 
continue on to and complete junior secondary education. In 1996, national figures established 
that 92.6 per cent of primary school graduates entered junior secondary schools, while only 
48.8 per cent of those graduates managed to secure a place in a senior secondary school (Lo, 
1999).  
In Hongtong County, the unavailability of data means those transitions, from primary into 
junior and on to senior secondary schools, cannot be quantified. A rough estimate of the 
transition from junior into senior secondary education can be made, given that both schooling 
systems have three class levels. In 2002, there were 41,323 students enrolled in junior 
secondary schools (including one vocational school), compared to 7,174 students enrolled in 
senior secondary schools. The number of senior high students was roughly 17 per cent that of 
junior secondary school students. These results mirrored a comment made by a local teacher 
who stated that only about 20 per cent of junior secondary school students managed to get 
into senior secondary schools. This large gap is the result of a combination of factors, a 
crucial one being cost. Parents who have a child in a junior secondary school pay between a 
                                                 
17 One teacher working for a primary school in Dahuaishu Town, for example, made 2,000 yuan per month 
teaching maths on weekends, but received only 800 yuan in her monthly school salary. 
18 Between 2000 and 2005 illiteracy in China increased by 33 per cent. Two of the main reasons for this increase 
were the cost of education and rural-urban migration (Fan, 2007).  
19 Officially this respondent would also be considered as an illiterate person, as literacy in China is defined 
according to an exam taken in fourth grade. A literate person should be able to read and write at least 1,500 
Chinese characters (Fan, 2007).  
20 Interview carried out on 16 Oct. 2003.  
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couple of hundred to about a 1,000 yuan per academic year on miscellaneous fees. In contrast, 
those who intend to get their child through senior secondary education need to pay over 6,000 
yuan per year in tuition fees,21
 
 and are expected to pay for the three years of schooling in 
advance in order to secure a place for their child. 
Altogether, out of 54 rural workers interviewed, more than half had left school after 
completing nine years of compulsory education. While cost was an important reason for their 
decision to leave school, other reasons included bullying by fellow classmates and even by 
teachers, the pressure of doing well in exams, and the appeal of outside work (da gong). At 
senior secondary level pursuing education became more of a matter of rational consideration 
of cost and benefit. If a student was not outstanding – even when the household could afford 
tuition fees – he or she would typically opt to work elsewhere, rather than go through the 
disappointment of failing the university entrance examination. 
 
Household registration did not seem to present a barrier to rural students seeking to enter 
urban schools. Competition among schools to attract students had virtually removed 
discrimination on the grounds of registration status. Reflecting this situation, in 2004 the 
Linfen City government issued a regulation by which all school-age children from the area – 
irregardless of their urban household registration – would be able to enrol in any public 
school within the jurisdiction of the city. The new guidelines, in theory, left out those 
children born outside of Linfen City. In practice, however, schools were also taking in rural 
migrant children from outside the county, and most had abolished extra enrolment fees for 
outsiders. Hence, although favouring local children over those from outside the Linfen area, 
this attempt to regionalize the provision of educational services did not necessarily made 
access for rural students more difficult. Rather, it was cost that presented the biggest barrier 
to further education.  
 
Of those from outside the Linfen City area two had enrolled their children in schools in the 
Dahuashu Town area (in both rural and urban schools). They were long-term migrants, who 
had been living in Hongtong County for over 5 years and who were planning to stay there 
permanently. Only one of these respondents mentioned paying extra fees (100 yuan per 
school year) for his child’s education. 22
 
 This suggests a significant improvement of the 
educational opportunities for the children of rural workers, mainly for county natives living 
or working in the town. Not surprisingly, however, this group of county natives who could 
afford to send their children to the better schools were also among the better-off and/or better 
educated from within the sample of rural respondents. 
Health and Education: Governing a Changing Welfare Regime in a Mixed Economy  
 
The practices portrayed in the previous section illustrate some of the ways in which the 
relationship between state and society has been transformed and how that relationship 
continues to evolve with the establishment and reinforcement of institutions and the advent of 
increased marketization. This dialectical relationship between state and society, made more 
evident at the lower echelons of the administrative hierarchy (Pieke, 2004; Li, 2006), does 
not necessarily imply a weakening of the state by the market or the social, but brings about 
                                                 
21 This amount includes tuition fees, textbook fees and boarding. Most senior secondary schools are set up as 
boarding schools, since many of the students come from other towns, townships, and villages. Sometimes, even 
children whose parents reside in the town where the school is located will also board in the school and go home 
over the weekend.   
22 The children of this respondent were enrolled in a village school within Dahuaishu Town’s jurisdiction.  
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what Rocca describes as a process of ‘societalization’ of the state and ‘stateification’ of 
society that brings state and society closer (Rocca, 2003, 4). Guided by the process of 
administrative and fiscal decentralization, the state is rearticulated at the sub-national level 
along administrative hierarchies, where urban centres are the main point of public-private 
negotiation. And although influenced by similar processes, China’s various administrative 
scales create distinct socio-economic spaces.  
 
County governments have perhaps been the entity adopting more liberal and practical 
approaches to economic reform and marketization. Their relatively low status in the 
administrative hierarchy has in some instances proved to be an advantage, as it allows for a 
less orthodox implementation of national policies. County governments have been pioneers in 
finding solutions to local development issues within the social and in the emergent private 
sector. Welfare and public service provision have been two areas in which private 
participation has been actively encouraged. Already increased commercialization and 
diminishing government funding has meant that a growing share of health care expenditure 
has had to be assumed by private end users (in the public sector). At the same time, the 
private sector has become an increasingly important provider of health services, filling in the 
gap left by inefficient or sometimes unavailable public medical units. But rather than 
developing in opposition to the public sector, the links between government and private 
providers of social services and welfare has often been a tacit one within a wide framework 
of formal and informal public-private cooperative projects (Carrillo, 2010).  
 
Health  
 
Quantifying the county government’s participation in health care financing over time was far 
from an accurate exercise. The lack of consistent statistical information on social indicators at 
and below county level, meant the analysis had to rely heavily on qualitative data (mainly 
interviewee responses) when making assumptions about current and pre-existing conditions 
in the county’s health sector. Figures for 2000 showed that county government expenditure 
on health care provision was much lower than that on education and pension funds for retired 
civil servants (Table 2). By 2002 health accounted for 5.69 per cent of total budget 
expenditures, while shares for education and pensions stood at 26.5 and 14.95 per cent 
respectively. An additional contribution to the health sector is provided through the social 
insurance subsidy, which includes allocations for the social health insurance fund pool. In the 
short to medium term, however, as the number of insured workers gradually increases, the 
county government will need to increase subsidies for social security – at least until insurance 
fund pools have been strengthened.      
 
Meantime, private providers have become active suppliers of health and education services. 
In the health sector the relationship between the county government and private health care 
providers has been an ambiguous one, due to conflicting interest with public medical 
institutions that lobby the local government for a more stringent regulation of the private 
sector. Yet, the local government is aware of the growing demand for cheap medical services, 
a demand that the private sector has more rapidly and effectively addressed. In interviews 
with both rural and urban household registration respondents, private providers were 
mentioned as the first choice of medical provider for out-patient services, even among those 
respondents covered with medical insurance. The private health sector in Dahuaishu Town 
and in Hongtong County in general, however, was not very sophisticated and could only 
handle simple non-life threatening diseases. Its participation in in-patient service provision 
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remained very limited. Private hospitals had nevertheless started to appear in Dahuaishu 
Town, with two small private hospitals opening between 2003 and 2005.  
 
One of these hospitals was financed by a private coal entrepreneur, who recruited the former 
director of the No. 1 People’s Hospital (the largest public hospital in the county) to manage 
the new hospital.23
 
 Health care provision had clearly been identified by many entrepreneurs 
as a profitable business. The hospital had launched a vigorous advertising campaign through 
the local radio and television, and had also secured an agreement with the private insurer 
China Life Insurance Company Limited (Zhongguo renshoubaozhang gongsi) to take in 
privately insured individuals. Recruitment of staff was done through informal connections 
between the investor and the head doctor, with local government cadres playing the role of 
intermediaries. Similarly, medical staff was selected through personal recommendations from 
doctors in the public sector. With experience in the workings of the public health care sector, 
the director of this private hospital complained about the harsher imposition of regulations on 
private providers, particularly on service price benchmarks. Nonetheless, this doctor seemed 
positive about the financial future of his medical institution. Measuring success in terms of 
economic gain is not an unusual thing among private service providers, though this has also 
been the case in most public service units (PSU) all over China. This reflects a growing trend 
by which increasingly various dimensions of health care and education services are being 
viewed by both providers and consumers as private rather than as public goods. 
Education 
 
Government support for providers of private education has been more open than that towards 
the health sector. Officials from the County Education Department readily provide 
information about private providers of education and boast about their rapid expansion. 
Education – to a greater extent than health – has become a new alternative sector for local 
investors and entrepreneurs, many of whom have made their fortunes from coal mining and 
coal related industries. Between 2002 and 2008 coal and coke prices experienced a rapid 
surge due to increasing energy demand. Given more recent pressures to keep a check on 
pollution, part of the profits created by this economic boom has been re-invested in education, 
which is seen as a more secure long term investment. Yet, education is a much more 
sophisticated sector than coalmining. And, like in the example of the private hospital, 
investors have sought alliances with public officials and teachers to help them establish and 
run their schools. The children of county cadres – often the best educated individuals in the 
county – have played an important role in the development of private education in the county.  
 
Private schools have developed mostly as a complement to instruction in public schools, 
although a handful of comprehensive private schools had become well consolidated. The 
presence of private kindergartens and childcare centres was also particularly salient because 
of their abundance. The emergence of a growing number of these private institutions is a 
response to the demand by parents trying to build their children’s educational background 
from as early as possible. It is also a reflection of the limited number of public facilities 
available at that level. These kindergartens were a convenient and cheap alternative for 
working parents. Elite private primary and secondary schools in the county town tended to 
cater to wealthier students, often coming from other townships, where the quality of 
educational was lower. 
                                                 
23 In 2004, the year the hospital was inaugurated; it had 23 staff members (11 medical staff) and 20 hospital 
beds.  
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Yet, in the county town public schools continue to take the lead, as they are the ones turning 
out more successful candidates at university entrance examinations. According to the former 
Director of the County Education Department the two senior secondary schools in the county 
produced on average 1,000 successful applicants annually. Private schools are thus not 
challenging the public educational sector, but are rather aiding students in their attempts to 
enter public schools at higher educational levels. Comprehensive private schools provide an 
alternative for students who have not been able to secure entrance into selected public schools, 
but whose ultimate goal is to go back into the public system at senior secondary or university 
level. Those who can afford the tuition fees of these private institutions are usually within a 
middle and high income groups.  
 
Competition from urban peers and schooling costs puts rural students at a disadvantage in 
their attempts to further their education. For this reason, after completion of the nine years of 
compulsory education many rural students were taking on apprenticeships with friends and 
relatives or at private training centres and workshops. This was the strategy which allowed 
them to more rapidly insert themselves into the local labour market. These differences in 
educational expectations and attainment have thus channelled rural and urban students into 
differentiated job markets. Nonetheless, in the county town even jobs dominated by urban 
residents did not necessitate exceptionally high educational levels, thus factors other than 
education were at play in labour market segmentation. Particularly in the public and 
government sectors, permanent jobs have been only available to those with an urban 
registration. Nevertheless, employment in the public sector was no longer in high demand, 
given relatively lower salaries and bad performance of many state owned firms.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Responsibilities over public service and social insurance provision have presented a 
particularly heavy burden for local governments, given the current restructuring of the state 
owned industrial sector, of its public service enterprises, and fiscal and budgeting systems. 
The case of Hongtong County shows that although those issues are constraining the 
government’s ability to provide services and a more rapid expansion of insurance coverage, it 
also gives evidence that local governments are aware of the problem and are taking action 
within their capabilities.  
 
Initial County government action focused on the plight of laid-off workers from SOEs, 
following Central government directives that emphasised the need to channel dismissed 
workers into the labour market to keep unemployment levels under control. Similarly, a 
substantial share of the County’s expenditure was secured to guarantee generous pension 
benefits for civil servants. Nevertheless, financial support for urban labour social insurances 
has not been neglected, and has rapidly increased since the early 2000s, though from very 
low initial levels. In order to build up social insurance fund pools – to allow for those 
insurances to become a real safety net – the Labour and Social Security Department needs to 
more actively engage private enterprises.   
 
Perhaps more crucial than the actual scale of coverage are people’s expectations about the 
right level of social protection the government should be delivering to its citizens. Those 
expectations have been greatly influenced by each individual’s previous access to social 
security and welfare. Consequently, SOE workers – particularly those who have lost their 
jobs and their access to welfare benefits – typically have held a more negative view regarding 
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the new social protection policies (Wong and Lee, 2000; Tang, 2001). In Hongtong County, 
the overall participation of the state-owned sector in the local economy had been limited, thus 
although a large part of it changed ownership the number of disaffected laid-off workers was 
relatively small in relationship to the overall population of the county. There is potential to 
achieve a more equitable access and provision of public services and social insurances if 
county governments – through the relevant departments – are able to include a greater 
number of workers from all economic sectors in the new social security system.  
 
So far, given weak social security funds and financial resources Hongtong County 
government – aware of the strength of the private sector – had allowed and encouraged 
participation of private providers in the delivery of public services such as health and 
education. But rather than pursuing an outright privatisation of service provision, it promoted 
both formal and informal ties between public and private providers, resulting in a complex 
pattern of provision; one in which ad hoc public-private partnerships are being formed. Even 
though this follows from Central directives encouraging the ‘societalization’ of the social 
security system and service provision, the county government’s efforts to engage the private 
sector are at the same time a practical approach and solution to the shortcomings of public 
provision.  
 
The empirical data suggests that private providers have allowed a greater number of people, 
in particular rural migrant workers, to access medical services at a lower cost than those 
offered by public medical institutions. The lack of sophistication of private medical 
institutions, however, means that they can only provide basic medical services. Treatment of 
serious and chronic disease can only be dealt with at public hospitals, often only accessible to 
those with social health insurance or the financial resources. Public and private medical 
providers are increasingly coming into direct competition for patients, especially for out-
patient services. With appropriate regulation and guidance, public and private medical 
providers could cooperate to have each focus on supplying the services they can more 
efficiently provide, so as to avoid duplication of responsibilities and waste of resources. In 
tandem, continuous efforts should be made to expand health insurance coverage to all sectors 
of the economy and to all workers irregardless of their registration status. Offering this 
safeguard – and those of other social insurance schemes – to rural migrant workers will prove 
a much stronger incentive for these workers to permanently settle in small urban areas, than 
the mere offer of acquiring an urban registration.24
 
 
In the education sector profit seeking rather than public-private competition per se has had 
negative consequences for equity, access, quality and cost of education.25
                                                 
24 Similarly, Zhu argues that the reform of the household registration system alone is not a strong enough 
incentive to encourage migrant workers to settle in the cities with their families (Zhu, 2007). Their vulnerability 
in the city due to labour and economic conditions, apart from their residential status, makes temporary migration 
a less economically risky option for rural households.  
 Unequal access to 
education can have perverse consequences for the long term well-being of individuals, 
because those educational opportunities shape an individual’s social trajectory from early on 
(Postiglione, 2006). In Hongtong County greater access to public schools has been offered to 
the children of rural migrant workers, particularly those from within the Linfen City area. 
Moreover, competition between public and private schools for students, for example, has lead 
public schools to abolish extra fees charged on non-local children. Advances in compulsory 
schooling within the county have been important. And although miscellaneous fees for the 
25 See for example: (China Development Brief , 1 June 2006). 
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nine years of compulsory education continue to rise, most households can afford to support 
their children through to junior secondary school.  
 
The dramatic decrease in the number of students that continue on to senior secondary 
education is more closely related to the cost and the economic returns of the investment into 
education. High tuition fees, the difficulties of entering and affording a university education, 
and the difficulties for university graduates to find a job makes further education a relatively 
unattractive option. Particularly in a small town like Dahuaishu where most job opportunities 
require relatively low levels of education, many rural students are keener on joining the 
labour market once out of junior high or even earlier.  
 
While cadres’ incentives to proactively implement social policies at the local level are related 
to pressures from above (Central government mandates and the cadre responsibility system), 
they are also increasingly a response to grass roots pressures and characteristics.  It is not 
only a response to the threat of social instability, but the realization that provision of social 
services such as health and education are necessary for the socio-economic development of 
their locality. The empirical data from Hongtong County shows that private provision, in the 
health sector in particular has in some instances become a more affordable option and 
sometimes the only available option to vulnerable social groups such as rural migrant 
workers. At the same time, the development of a market for schooling also highlighted the 
need for stronger regulation and increased public funding to guarantee a more equitable 
access to education. Moreover, as the private sector continues to expand its role as employer 
and economic actor within small urban centres it is imperative for local governments to 
recruit private enterprises into social insurance schemes, to both strengthen local fund pools 
and to provide workers in the private sector with some security.  
 
Between 2006 and 2009, both as a result of the global financial crisis and a campaign by the 
Central and provincial governments to take over the majority of private mines and to control 
the power of Shanxi’s private ‘coal bosses’ the whole province experienced a severe 
economic slowdown. During the first half of 2009 Shanxi became the only Chinese province 
to experience negative growth at minus 4.4 per cent (People’s Daily Online, 8 Aug. 2009). 
The economic restructuring taking place in the province has been rolled out as an attempt to 
move away from ‘black’ towards a ‘greener’ development. Yet, critics have described the 
process as an attempt to curve the power of increasingly wealthy private entrepreneurs in the 
coal mining sector. Since the mid 1990s many of them had invested in education and health; 
however, given the relatively slow returns and the current economic restructuring private 
investment in those two sectors is likely to decrease. Without a clear and active strategy on 
the part of local governments to engage and better regulate private participation the 
contribution so far made by the private sector to both the supply and access to services could 
be lost. Aligning public and private provision towards the attainment of specific public goals 
is particularly crucial during difficult economic times.  
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